Wittgenstein saw psychoanalysis as a myth masquerading as science, acquiring dangerous persuasive powers from the confusion. Bouveresse, a much-published professor at the Collège de France, notes that Wittgenstein did not object to myths or for that matter to persuasive discourse; he thought that philosophy by its nature is persuasive. But for him psychoanalysis confused the categories, which is precisely where the dangers lie; it could not be a science because not all mental events have causes, much less the "necessary meanings" that Freudians assign them. Bouveresse admits that Wittgenstein was not consistent (he once said that Freud could claim "extraordinary scientific achievements"). But Wittgenstein generally feared schemes that drew people into preordained mindsets and was deeply suspicious of attempts to build science itself into a mind-controlling ideology. Bouveresse's book, unfortunately, manages only in the last chapter to confront the questions of morality and persuasion that concerned Wittgenstein. But it does expose the major issues, and the translation is clear. For general readers with a taste for scholarly infighting and niggles.‘Leslie Armour & Suzie Johnston, Univ. of Ottawa (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.